


STATEMENT OF : ANDREW JOSEF FEINSTEIN  
DATE OF BIRTH : 16 MARCH 1964  
OCCUPATION OF WITNESS : EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SHADOW  
WORLD INVESTIGATIONS LTD, AUTHOR &  
RESEARCHER ON THE GLOBAL ARMS TRADE


This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 4th day of November 2021

Signed:



Signature witnessed by .....



1. My name is Andrew Feinstein, and I am the executive director of Shadow World Investigations. The organisation, established in 2009 and based in London, details instances of corruption, human rights abuses and other malfeasance in the global arms trade.
2. I am a South African investigative writer based permanently in the UK. I served as an ANC Member of Parliament in South Africa for over seven years - on Parliament's Finance committee, as Deputy Chair of the country's Audit Commission and as the ranking ANC member on the key financial oversight body, the Public Accounts Committee.
3. My book *The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade*, was published in 2011. It has just been published in its tenth edition and has been described by the *Washington Post* as "the most complete account [of the global arms trade] ever written." I am the author of another best-selling book and have contributed chapters and articles to numerous volumes and academic journals, most recently for the *Brown Journal of World Affairs* on "The Failure Of The Regulation Of The Global Arms Trade As A Consequence Of High-Level Conflicts Of Interest."
4. I am currently undertaking research for the UN Office on Drugs and Crime on the deleterious role of intermediation and offsets in the global arms trade.
5. I was named as one of the hundred most influential people working on armed violence globally by Action On Armed Violence. I am the recipient of numerous research fellowships and academic honours.

6. I have trained personnel in investigative research methods at organisations including the UK's Serious Fraud Office, the Auditor-General's Office of Norway, the South African Revenue Service and numerous prosecutor's offices around the world.
7. I have, on occasion, been requested to assist Dutch authorities, including Dutch police, with enquiries into illegality in arms trading by Dutch entities and/or citizens.

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8. For the purposes of these proceedings I can attest that:
  - a) The Egyptian navy is not a discrete force, operating separately and independently of the other arms of the Egyptian military;
  - b) The Egyptian navy has participated in internal repression and violations of human rights; and
  - c) The ultimate end use of exported military equipment is notoriously difficult to ascertain and The Netherlands, like most countries, does little if anything to determine this.
9. I have written extensively about the Egyptian military, its economic and defence activities, most notably, but not exclusively, in *The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade* (Penguin, London, 2012 and subsequent editions), especially but not exclusively in chapter 19.
10. The Egyptian military is at the centre of both corrupt economic activity and continuous violations of human rights within Egypt. It has also engaged in possible violations of international law outside Egypt, specifically in relation to the Yemen conflict.
11. It is factually incorrect to state that defence goods exported to the Egyptian navy are unlikely to be used in internal repression and/or violations of human rights domestically and/or abroad.
12. While it undertakes certain functions independently, on the whole, the navy acts operationally together with the other arms of the Egyptian military, that is, the army and the air force. This is the case in most countries but particularly so in Egypt, where all three arms of the military operate under the formal, unified command of the High Military Council. Integrated operations, and the cross-utilisation of equipment, are extremely common-place as a consequence of Egypt's geographical, operational, economic and political realities.
13. It is also common-place in Egypt, as in many other countries, for equipment that is imported by one branch of the military, to be utilised by other branches of that military in operations, both domestic and foreign.
14. This is especially so in the case of Egypt for two primary reasons: (1) The general economic status of the country determines that equipment is far more integrated and, thus, utilised across service branches for cost-effectiveness, unlike in the case of say, the United States of America. And (2) the command structures of the navy, army and air force co-operate and work together, both formally and informally, on a wide range of economic activity, much of it involving illicit material benefit. They co-operate in

mutually beneficial ways and are dependent on each other retaining discretion about the illicit aspects of such activity.

15. Crucially, in addition to the High Military Council, the three branches of the military are answerable informally to Military Intelligence which is implicated in significant allegations of repression and human rights violation. The current President was previously head of Military Intelligence, a position which was then occupied by his son. A number of commentators go so far as to suggest that it is the intelligence establishment which ultimately controls the entire military and that they utilise the military branches in an inter-connected manner as they need them.
16. This was most obviously evidenced when a military coup assumed power from the democratically-elected President Morsi in 2013. The President was physically arrested, and allegedly tortured by, a senior Navy official. [This was established in a series of leaked documents which were published by the *New York Times* and the *Guardian*: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/world/middleeast/recordings-suggest-emirates-and-egyptian-military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html>; [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/05/sisileaks-egypt-watergate-abdel-fatah-al-sisi?CMP=Share\\_iOSApp\\_Other](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/05/sisileaks-egypt-watergate-abdel-fatah-al-sisi?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other)]
17. There is significant evidence that the navy has been engaged in internal repression and violation of the human rights of Egyptian citizens in the North Sinai region, amongst others, (<https://egyptwatch.net/2021/08/02/efhr-human-rights-violations-increase-in-sinai-along-with-military-escalation/>) in addition to possible violations of international law in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition. (<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-egypt-idUSKCN0US1VF20160114>; [https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/55920/Into-Egypt's-role-in-the-Yemeni-crisis](https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/55920/Into-Egypt-s-role-in-the-Yemeni-crisis))
18. The ultimate end-use of exported military materiel is extremely difficult to ascertain. As I have documented in my work, often one country will purchase materiel that is on-sold or made available to other countries and/or non-state militias. This is even more common within countries, especially in less democratic or repressive states such as Egypt, where materiel purchased for one branch of the military will often be used by other branches, or by intelligence agencies or even informal groups which foment violence, unrest and/or repression on behalf of political leaders.
19. Dutch authorities do not undertake any post-sales checks to ensure that the stated end-user is, in fact, the actual or only user of the materiel it exports. The Dutch authorities are, therefore, unable to guarantee by whom and for what purposes its exported equipment is actually utilised.
20. All the information in this evidence is drawn from my own extensively referenced work, and/or human sources, unless otherwise stated. More detailed information is available to the Court on request.